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ABSTRACT
According to various “harm-based” approaches to the non-identity 
problem, an action that brings a particular child into existence can also 
harm that child, even if his or her life is worth living. In the third chapter of 
The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People, David Boonin 
surveys a variety of harm-based approaches and argues that none of them 
are successful. In this paper I argue that his objections to these various 
approaches do not impugn a harm-based approach that Boonin does not 
consider, an approach I call the “existence solution to the non-identity 
problem”. I also argue that the existence solution is more plausible than 
Boonin’s own proposed solution.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One strategy for solving the non-identity problem is to hold that in some 
cases, an action that brings a particular child into existence can also harm 
him or her, even if the child’s life is worth living. This approach, which I 
will call the “harm-based” approach, is the focus of the third chapter of 
David Boonin’s (2014) book, The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of 
Future People. In the chapter, Boonin considers versions of the harm-based 
approach developed by Matthew Hanser (2008, 2009), Elizabeth Harman 
(2004, 2009), Seana Shiffrin (1999), and others, and he argues that either 
these views fail to deliver a sufficiently robust solution to the non-identity 
problem or else they lack plausibility (which Boonin refers to as “modesty”). 
1  For helpful feedback on this paper, I thank Eden Lin and two anonymous referees 
for this journal.
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He concludes that no version of the harm-based approach will succeed, for 
the weaknesses of the views he criticizes will afflict all other versions of the 
approach.
Has Boonin really identified fatal flaws in the views he considers, and 
do these flaws generalize to all other versions of the harm-based approach? 
I agree that some of Boonin’s objections are persuasive: Boonin has, 
indeed, shown that some versions of the harm-based approach are either 
immodest or insufficiently robust. However, I disagree with Boonin’s claim 
that these objections generalize to all versions of the harm-based approach. 
In what follows, I will argue that a particular version of the harm-based 
approach that Boonin does not consider—one that features the existence 
account of harming 2—does, in fact, deliver a robust solution to the non-
identity problem. Moreover, the costs of what I will call “the existence 
solution” are minimal: it requires less bullet-biting than other versions of 
the harm-based approach, and indeed, less bullet-biting than Boonin’s 
own view. 
To make my case, I will first provide a more precise characterization of 
both the non-identity problem and the harm-based approach to solving it. 
I will then explain what Boonin means when he objects to other versions of 
the harm-based approach on the grounds of either immodesty or a lack of 
robustness. In the fourth section, I will explain both the existence account 
of harming and the existence solution that it supports, and I will argue that 
the existence solution is neither insufficiently robust nor immodest. 
Finally, I will argue that the implications of Boonin’s own solution to the 
non-identity problem are less plausible, on balance, than are those of the 
existence solution.
2. THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM AND THE HARM-BASED 
APPROACH
The non-identity problem arises in cases where the existence of an 
individual whose life is worth living depends counterfactually upon an 
action that appears to be objectionable in virtue of some negative 
consequence the action has for the individual’s well-being. To illustrate the 
problem, Boonin constructs a case in which a doctor tells a woman named 
Wilma that if she conceives a child now, the child will be blind, but if she 
takes a pill once a day for two months and conceives after that, her child’s 
vision will be normal. Importantly, the blind child who would be born now 
2  I develop the existence account of harming more fully in Gardner (2015) and 
Gardner (2017). 
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(“Pebbles”) is not identical to the child who would be born two months 
from now (“Rocks”)—hence the term “non-identity”.3 The doctor tells 
Wilma that the pills are easy to take and have no side effects. Nevertheless, 
Wilma decides against taking the pills, and she conceives Pebbles instead 
of Rocks. Pebbles’ blindness is a significant detriment to her quality of life, 
but on the whole, her life is worth living.
To see how this case generates a philosophical problem, consider the 
tension between various intuitions people might have about the case. On 
the one hand, Pebbles is worse off than Rocks would have been had Wilma 
acted differently, and this consideration might suggest that there was 
something wrong with Wilma’s action. But on the other hand, Pebbles is no 
worse off than Pebbles would have been had Wilma acted differently; after 
all, if Wilma had not conceived now, Pebbles would not have been at all. 
This second consideration lends support to the notion that Wilma’s action 
was unobjectionable. Boonin attempts to capture the tension between 
these considerations with what he calls the “non-identity argument”, an 
argument whose five premises are highly plausible in themselves, but 
whose conclusion is so counterintuitive that Boonin refers to it as “the 
Implausible Conclusion”: 
(P1) Wilma’s act of conceiving now rather than taking a pill once a day 
for two months before conceiving does not make Pebbles worse off 
than she would otherwise have been.
(P2)  If A’s act harms B, then A’s act makes B worse off than B would 
otherwise have been.
(P3)  Wilma’s act of conceiving now rather than taking a pill once a day 
for two months before conceiving does not harm anyone other 
than Pebbles.
(P4)  If an act does not harm anyone, then the act does not wrong anyone.
(P5)  If an act does not wrong anyone, then the act is not morally wrong.
Therefore,
(C)  Wilma’s act of conceiving Pebbles is not morally wrong.
As Boonin notes, to solve the non-identity problem, we must either reject at 
least one of the plausible premises or accept the Implausible Conclusion. 
In the various chapters of his book, Boonin considers attempts to reject 
each of the five premises. He concludes that none of these attempts 
succeed, and he ends the book by endorsing the Implausible Conclusion.  
3  The term “non-identity problem” was coined by Derek Parfit (1984) to describe a 
problem that appears to have been independently discovered by Parfit (1976), Thomas Schwartz 
(1978), and Robert Adams (1979).
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For my purposes, the relevant chapter is the third one, in which Boonin 
criticizes various attempts to reject P2. What I’m calling the “harm-based” 
approach to the non-identity problem can be understood as any approach 
that tries to solve the non-identity problem by rejecting P2. To reject P2 is 
to maintain that an action can harm someone even if it doesn’t make the 
victim worse off than he or she would otherwise have been. Those who 
reject P2 usually appeal to some set of harm-based principles or some 
account of harming in order to justify their view. In Section 3, I will defend 
the account of harming that I believe can best justify the rejection of P2, 
namely, the existence account. First, however, I will review the two main 
objections that Boonin raises against other versions of the harm-based 
approach. 
3. ROBUSTNESS AND MODESTY
In organizing his objections to other versions of the harm-based approach, 
Boonin appeals to what he calls “the robustness requirement” and “the 
modesty requirement”: two requirements that a successful solution to the 
non-identity problem must meet. He claims that all versions of the harm-
based approach violate either the robustness requirement, the modesty 
requirement, or both; this is why he believes that no version of the harm-
based approach will successfully solve the non-identity problem. In this 
section, I will explain Boonin’s account of each requirement in turn.  
According to Boonin, a principle that purports to solve the non-identity 
problem by rejecting a premise of the non-identity argument meets the 
robustness requirement only if it is “strong enough to warrant rejecting any 
weakened version of the premise that would still be strong enough to 
generate the unqualified version of the Implausible Conclusion” (22). 
There are two things to note about this account of robustness. First, the 
phrase, “unqualified version of the Implausible Conclusion” is supposed to 
refer to the conclusion that Wilma’s act of conceiving Pebbles—in the 
case as originally described—is not morally wrong. A qualified version of 
that conclusion would involve adding new facts to the case, such as the 
fact that by conceiving Pebbles, Wilma violates a just law or breaks a 
promise. If we added the latter fact to the case, the qualified conclusion 
would be that Wilma’s act of conceiving Pebbles and thereby breaking a 
promise is not morally wrong. It is easy to undermine such a qualified 
conclusion, but as Boonin points out, doing so does not really help us 
solve the non-identity problem.  
The second thing to note about Boonin’s account of robustness is his 
reference to a “weakened version of the premise”. Recall that premise two 
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of the non-identity argument says that if A’s act harms B, then A’s act makes 
B worse off than B would otherwise have been. Here is a weakened version 
of that premise:
(W2) If Wilma’s act (in the case as originally described) harms Pebbles, 
then Wilma’s act makes Pebbles worse off than Pebbles would 
otherwise have been.
Boonin’s point is that it might be possible to find counterexamples to P2 
that would not be counterexamples to W2. But since W2 is still strong 
enough, on its own, to generate the unqualified Implausible Conclusion, a 
counterexample to P2 that did not undermine W2 would not really solve 
the non-identity problem. Thus, a harm-based solution to the non-identity 
problem satisfies the robustness requirement if and only if it undermines 
W2.
In addition to the robustness requirement, Boonin’s objections to the 
harm-based views also appeal to what he calls “the modesty requirement”. 
According to Boonin, a proposed solution to the non-identity problem will 
fail the modesty requirement if its implications are less plausible than the 
Implausible Conclusion. He writes, “The modesty requirement constitutes 
a reasonable constraint on a satisfactory solution to the non-identity 
problem because considerations about intuitive plausibility are precisely 
what give rise to the problem in the first place” (23). Thus, to meet the 
modesty requirement, a solution based on the existence account of 
harming (or any other view) must have implications that are more plausible 
than the claim that Wilma’s act of conceiving Pebbles is not morally wrong. 
As I noted above, Boonin’s main objections to various versions of the 
harm-based approach are that each version violates either the robustness 
requirement, the modesty requirement, or both. Thus, in order to show 
that the existence solution to the non-identity problem is impervious to 
Boonin’s main objections, I will need to show that it satisfies both 
requirements. In the next section, I will explain the existence solution to 
the non-identity problem and I will argue that it does, indeed, satisfy both.
4. SOLVING THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM WITH THE 
EXISTENCE ACCOUNT OF HARMING
I will introduce the existence account of harming by contrasting it with the 
second premise of the non-identity argument. Recall that according to P2, 
if A’s act harms B, then A’s act makes B worse off than B would otherwise 
have been. When we interpret this principle, it is natural to construe the 
word ‘makes’ as a causal verb: another way of stating P2 is to say that a 
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harmful action always causes the victim to be worse off than he or she 
otherwise would have been. And indeed, Boonin often uses causal language 
and counterfactual language interchangeably. Thus, he seems committed 
to the view that the following sentence implies that A causes B:
(D)  If A hadn’t happened, then B wouldn’t have happened.
However, the existence solution expressly rejects the notion that the D 
states a sufficient condition for causation. According to the existence 
solution, causation may be reducible to counterfactual dependence, but 
not in a way that makes the relation expressed by D sufficient for causation: 
the relationship between causation and counterfactual dependence is 
more complicated, and the two concepts play distinct roles in the solution 
to the non-identity problem.4  Here is the full existence account of harming:
Harming (def.): An event, E, harms an individual, S, if and only if E 
causes a state of affairs that is a harm for S.
Harm (def.): A state of affairs, T, is a harm for an individual, S, if and 
only if 
(i) There is an essential component of T that is a condition with 
respect to which S can be intrinsically better or worse off; and
(ii) If S existed and T had not obtained, then S would be better off 
with respect to that condition. 5
This account has at least three important features. First, it is compatible 
with the rejection of P2 in the non-identity argument. The existence 
account of harming does not imply that an action harms a victim only if 
the action makes the victim worse off than he or she would have been, had 
the action not been performed. Instead, it implies that an action harms a 
victim only if it makes the victim worse off than he or she would have been, 
had the victim existed without the upshot of the action. The existence 
account of harming thereby locates harm in the effects of various actions, 
and not in the causes of those effects.6 
Second, to assess whether an effect qualifies as a harm, the account 
does not ask us to compare a world in which the victim suffers the alleged 
harm to a possible world in which the victim does not exist at all. Instead, 
the account asks us to compare the world containing both the victim and 
4  I say more about the relationship between counterfactual dependence and causation 
in Gardner (forthcoming).
5  This formulation of the account comes from Gardner (2015).
6  If the reader is still uncertain what this means, don’t despair. Very shortly, I will 
illustrate how the view works by applying it to the case of Wilma and Pebbles.  For more on the 
advantages of an “effect-relative” account of harming over an “action-relative” account, see 
Gardner (2017).
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the alleged harm to a world where the victim exists without the alleged 
harm; we then check to see whether, in the latter world, the victim is better 
off. Such a comparison is legitimate because it is metaphysically possible 
for someone to exist without, say, being blind, even if, as a matter of fact, 
she would not have existed if the cause of her blindness hadn’t obtained. 
Even if your formative years are essential to your identity, such that you 
could not have existed if you had not been born blind, it is still metaphysically 
possible to become sighted at the age of, say, 15. So there is a possible world 
where you exist and are sighted, and we can compare your well-being in 
that possible world to your well-being in the world in which you are blind. 
Such a comparison is appropriate for ascertaining whether a state of affairs 
qualifies as a harm because a harm is the sort of thing you would be better 
off without. If we don’t consider the possible worlds where you exist in the 
absence of the alleged harm, it is impossible to determine whether you 
would be better off without it.7
A third important feature of the existence account of harming is that it 
yields a solution to the non-identity problem that is impervious to the two 
main objections that Boonin raises against other versions of the harm-
based approach. To show that this is so, I will explain how the existence 
solution satisfies both the robustness requirement and the modesty 
requirement, in turn.
Recall that a solution to the non-identity problem satisfies the robustness 
requirement if and only if it undermines W2, the claim that if Wilma’s act 
(in the case as originally described) harms Pebbles, then Wilma’s act makes 
Pebbles worse off than Pebbles would otherwise have been. Thus, I need to 
show that the existence account of harming implies, not only that an act 
can harm someone without making the victim worse off, but that Wilma’s 
act, in the case as originally described, harms Pebbles without making her 
worse off. I will show this by arguing that (a) there is a state of affairs that 
instantiates a comparatively poor showing along some intrinsic dimension 
of Pebbles’ well-being and (b) Wilma’s act causes that state of affairs. 
To see why there is a state of affairs that instantiates a comparatively 
poor showing along some intrinsic dimension of Pebbles’ well-being, recall 
the original description of the case involving Wilma and Pebbles. I noted 
there that Pebbles’ blindness is a significant detriment to her quality of life. 
This stipulation about the case (which is also featured in Boonin’s 
description of the case) means that for Pebbles, things are going 
comparatively worse along some dimension of her well-being.  (If her well-
being has only one dimension, then things are going comparatively worse 
7  For more on why we should build the assumption that S exists into the antecedent of 
the relevant counterfactual, see Gardner (2015: 436 – 437).
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for her, full stop.) What, exactly, is measured by that dimension of well-
being depends on which theory of well-being is correct; it may be that 
Pebbles is doing poorly with respect to her capabilities, her happiness, the 
satisfaction of her desires, or some other objective list of goods. Indeed, to 
more precisely describe the state of affairs that constitutes the harm for 
Pebbles, we would need to know which theory of well-being is correct. For 
example, if an objective list theory were true and if vision were on the 
objective list of goods, then the harm for Pebbles would be the state of 
affairs in which she is blind. But we do not need to describe the state of 
affairs so precisely in order to know that there is such a state of affairs. All 
we need to know is that there is some well-being-related state of affairs 
such that, if Pebbles existed and that state of affairs had not obtained, 
Pebbles would be faring better. And since we do know this, conditions (i) 
and (ii) in the above definition of harm are both satisfied.
We have so far established that Pebbles suffers a harm. The next question 
is whether Wilma’s act causes that harm. Does it? Someone might worry 
that we need to describe the state of affairs that is the harm more precisely 
in order to know whether Wilma’s act causes that harm. However, this is 
not so: in the case as described, the harmful state of affairs is closely 
connected to (if not identical to) the state of affairs in which Pebbles is 
blind. Therefore, if Wilma’s act causes the state of affairs in which Pebbles 
is blind, then by causing that state of affairs, her act also causes the state of 
affairs that is a harm for Pebbles. Thus, in order to show that Wilma’s act 
harms Pebbles, we need only to show that Wilma’s act causes the state of 
affairs in which Pebbles is blind.
Notice that a paradigmatic way of causing a state of affairs in which 
someone is blind is to blind someone after they have already been born. 
For example, suppose that Ted throws acid in Fred’s eyes, and from that 
point on Fred is blind. This is a clear case in which (a) Fred suffers a harm 
and (b) Ted caused that harm. 
Wilma’s act is different from Ted’s. Instead of inducing a certain 
biological property in an individual who already exists, Wilma’s act brings 
into existence an individual with that property. However, this difference is 
not as significant as it might initially appear to be. That is because the 
existence account of harming does not say that harming is a matter of 
causing someone to have a certain property. Instead, it says that harming 
is a matter of causing a particular state of affairs. And although the case of 
Ted and Fred shows that causing someone to have a certain property is one 
way of causing a particular state of affairs, it is not the only way. There are, 
in other words, at least two ways to cause the harm of blindness:  you can 
cause someone who already exists to be blind, or you can cause someone 
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to exist who will be blind. Wilma causes the existence of Pebbles, who will 
be blind, and so she causes a state of affairs that is a harm for Pebbles. This 
means that the definition of harming provided by the existence account of 
harming is also satisfied:  Wilma’s act harms Pebbles. Because the existence 
account of harming yields this result, Boonin’s robustness requirement is 
satisfied.
What about the modesty requirement? Recall that to meet the modesty 
requirement, a solution to the non-identity problem must not have 
implications that are less plausible than the Implausible Conclusion. 
Boonin does not consider the existence solution in his chapter, so I cannot 
be entirely sure which implications of the existence solution he would 
select for entry into a showdown with the Implausible Conclusion. 
Nevertheless, the two implications of the existence solution that Boonin 
and other opponents would probably find the most objectionable are the 
following:
(1) Counterfactual dependence is not a sufficient condition for 
causation; and 
(2) Some so-called “backtracking counterfactuals” are true.
In the remainder of this section, I will explain why the existence solution 
has each of these implications and then argue that such implications are 
not as bad as they might initially seem. 
First, however, I want to make an observation. In his critique of other 
harm-based views, the implications that Boonin objects to are not pure 
metaphysical principles in the way that (1) and (2) are. Instead, they are 
implications about concrete cases. Some of the implications that Boonin 
objects to, for example, are the following: 
(3) When I prevent you from receiving the medicine you need, I don’t 
harm you (60).
(4) When I “shoot you in self-defense or as part of the prosecution of a 
just war”, I don’t harm you (63).
(5) When a doctor performs a procedure that causes a patient named 
Ray to regain his vision for forty years and then lose it again, the 
doctor wrongfully harms Ray (68).
(6) Every act of conception harms the person who is conceived (70). 
The relative concreteness of these claims makes it easier for Boonin to 
argue that they are less plausible than the Implausible Conclusion. This is 
because Boonin often appeals to what his colleagues and students actually 
think in order to establish the comparative plausibility of various 
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propositions (25). And in my experience, students, in particular, are 
relatively confident when they form judgments about concrete cases of 
stealing medicine, shooting people, operating on people, conceiving 
children, and so on. However, I find that students tend to be less confident 
when they are asked how plausible claims like (1) and (2) are; there is less 
of a basis in what we might call “commonsense metaphysics” for either 
affirming or rejecting (1) and (2) directly. So to test (1) and (2) against 
common sense, we need to see how these abstract claims function within 
broader metaphysical theories that, through complicated chains of 
entailment, might eventually support or undercut our more easily testable, 
commonsense intuitions. I believe that (1) and (2) fit extraordinarily well 
within a broader metaphysical picture that supports a great deal of our 
commonsense intuitions about causation, harm, and wrongdoing. I cannot 
fully support such a claim in this article, but I will present some of the main 
reasons I believe this is so. At this point, however, I wish to simply to 
acknowledge the fact that the ostensibly implausible implications of the 
existence solution are slightly more abstract than the ostensibly implausible 
implications of other harm-based views. 
Here is why the existence solution is committed to (1), the claim that 
counterfactual dependence is not a sufficient condition for causation. 
According to the existence solution, Wilma harms Pebbles by conceiving 
her, and this helps explain why Wilma’s action was morally wrong. 
However, if counterfactual dependence were a sufficient condition for 
causation, then every parent would harm his or her child by bringing that 
child into existence. After all, we all suffer numerous harms throughout 
our lives: we get sick, we get injured, we suffer distress, and of course, we 
die. All of the corresponding harms depend counterfactually on the 
proposition that our parents conceived us. If our parents had not conceived 
us, we would not have suffered such harms. Thus, if counterfactual 
dependence were sufficient for causation, there would be little point in 
focusing on the harm associated with Pebbles’s blindness—just one of the 
myriad harms that Wilma causes Pebbles, and probably not nearly the 
worst—and supposing that our knowledge of this one harm could, by itself, 
settle the question of whether Wilma acted wrongly.
Instead of endorsing counterfactual dependence as a sufficient 
condition for causation, the existence solution affirms a distinction 
between a cause and a mere condition. According to the existence solution, 
there is a good reason for Wilma to focus on Pebbles’ blindness, rather than 
all the other harms that Pebbles will suffer: namely, Wilma causes the state 
of affairs in which Pebbles is blind, but her action is merely the condition of 
those other harms. From Wilma’s perspective, Pebbles’ blindness generates 
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a relatively strong reason against conceiving Pebbles, and those other 
harms do not. And if, as seems to be true in the case Boonin constructs, 
this reason against conceiving Pebbles is not outweighed by countervailing 
reasons, then conceiving Pebbles is wrong.
That is why the existence solution is committed to the claim that 
counterfactual dependence is not sufficient for causation. But is this 
commitment more implausible than the Implausible Conclusion? It would 
be more implausible if there were no defensible principles of causation that 
could accommodate such a commitment. But fortunately for the existence 
solution, there are coherent principles of causation that reject counter-
factual dependence as sufficient for causation and instead support a 
distinction between a cause and a mere condition.8 Moreover, there is good 
reason to accept such causal principles; they cohere remarkably well with 
the judgements about fault and blame that we make in law and everyday 
morality.9 We don’t, for example, blame our parents for our deaths (unless 
they do, in fact, kill us); we don’t blame the fall of Rome on the meteor that 
wiped out the dinosaurs; and we don’t attribute the election of Donald 
Trump to the existence of Earth’s magnetic field. Thus, insofar as common 
sense morality has a role to play in vindicating Boonin’s view, it can play 
that role equally well or better in vindicating the distinction between a 
cause and a mere condition.  
As I noted above, the second implication that I believe opponents of the 
existence solution would object to is the claim that some so-called 
“backtracking counterfactuals” are true. To understand what a backtracking 
counterfactual is, consider two events, A and B, and suppose that B happens 
later in time than A. A foretracking counterfactual—the kind I have rejected 
as a sufficient condition for causation—takes this form:
(O)  If A hadn’t happened, then B wouldn’t have happened. 
By contrast, a backtracking counterfactual takes this form:
(B) If B hadn’t happened, then A wouldn’t have happened.
Thus, backtracking counterfactuals express a way of reasoning backwards: 
we reason that if a later event had not happened, an earlier event would not 
8 For some causal principles that support a distinction between a cause and a mere 
condition, see Hart and Honoré (1985), Broadbent (2008), Gardner (forthcoming), and 
McGrath (2005). The existence solution is committed to the claim that at least one such 
account is correct. 
9 Indeed, Hitchcock (2007) contrasts what he calls a “folk attributive” concept of 
causation—a concept that includes a distinction between a cause and a mere condition—
with both a “metaphysical” concept of causation and a “scientific” concept of causation. He 
argues that the folk attributive concept and the scientific concept have promise, but he 
expresses skepticism that we need a theory of the “metaphysical” concept. 
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have happened. When uttered, many backtracking counterfactuals sound 
somewhat more awkward than foretracking counterfactuals, and this may 
be one of the reasons that philosophers tend not to appeal to them. As Alex 
Broadbent argues, it sounds odd to say, “If I had been richer, I would have 
chosen a different career”. Nevertheless, he notes that the inference, itself, 
is not odd, for we can make sense of the claim, “For me to have been richer, 
I would have to have chosen a different career”. Moreover, he notes that not 
all backtracking counterfactuals sound so odd, even when we leave out 
constructions like ‘would have to have’; there is nothing objectionable 
about saying “If the librarian had not gone into the library, she would not 
have left her fingerprints on the door”10.
To see why the existence solution is committed to the claim that some 
backtracking counterfactuals are true, consider the following case: 
Dim Vision. Because of retinal damage he suffered long ago, Jones has 
been blind for many years. Dr. Smith performs an operation that 
repairs some but not all of the damage. After the operation, Jones can 
see, but not very well: he has a condition we can call dim vision.11  
A common intuition about this case is that Dr. Smith does not harm Jones; 
instead, he benefits Jones by improving his vision. The existence account 
of harming can justify this intuition if we appeal to the following 
backtracking counterfactual: 
(V) If Jones existed and the state of affairs in which he has dim vision 
did not obtain, then Dr. Smith wouldn’t have operated and Jones would 
have been worse off in some respect.
If V is true, then dim vision isn’t a harm for Jones, and Dr. Smith didn’t 
harm Jones by causing it. But if no backtracking counterfactuals are true, 
then V isn’t true, and the existence account of harming cannot justify the 
claim that Dr. Smith did not harm Jones. This would be a problem for the 
existence account of harming, given that there are many cases of helping 
that bear a structural similarity to Dim Vision, and the existence account 
would have to hold that all of these were cases of harming, rather than 
10 See his unpublished book manuscript, No Smoke Without Fire: 18 – 19.
11 This case comes from Hanser (2009) and is also discussed in Harman (2009), 
Thomson (2010), and Gardner (2015).
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helping.12 
Fortunately, I do not think it is implausible to hold that some backtracking 
counterfactuals are true. As I noted above, such counterfactuals appear to 
support many of our inferences, especially those that are inferences to the 
best explanation. Moreover, there is support for the truth of some 
backtracking counterfactuals in the metaphysics literature.13 To my 
knowledge, we currently lack a fully developed semantics for evaluating 
the truth or falsity of backtracking counterfactuals. Nevertheless, we lack 
an uncontroversial semantics for evaluating the truth or falsity of 
foretracking counterfactuals as well. This hasn’t stopped us from 
incorporating foretracking counterfactuals into our theories and making 
intuitive judgments about whether they are true or false, so it should not 
stop us from appealing to and using our intuitions to evaluate backtracking 
counterfactuals.
5. A BULLET-BITING SHOWDOWN
Let us take stock. I have so far explained the non-identity problem, the 
harm-based approach to solving it, and how the existence solution fits into 
the harm-based approach. I have also reviewed Boonin’s two requirements 
for successfully solving the non-identity problem—the robustness 
requirement and the modesty requirement—and I have argued that the 
existence solution to the non-identity problem satisfies both of them. In 
this final section, I will present some reasons for thinking that the existence 
solution is a better solution than Boonin’s own proposal.  
As I noted in the introduction, Boonin’s own proposal for solving the 
non-identity problem is to accept the Implausible Conclusion. His reason 
for doing so is that he believes that every other proposal for solving the 
12 Notice that the backtracking counterfactual we appeal to in Dim Vision has us 
“imagine away” Dr. Smith’s action and then consider how much better or worse off Jones 
would be. In effect, then, the possible world we consider when we imagine the absence of 
Jones’s new condition is the same possible world we imagine when we employ the principle 
that serves as P2 in the non-identity argument. This is why, in cases that don’t involve either 
preemption or bringing a person into existence, the existence account of harming delivers 
all the same verdicts that are delivered by the account of harming that Boonin favors (2014: 
53). Importantly, however, the existence account of harming delivers different verdicts in 
preemption and non-identity cases. To see why the verdict is different in non-identity cases, 
compare the following two counterfactuals:  (1) If Jones existed and didn’t have dim vision, 
Dr. Smith wouldn’t have operated; and (2) If Pebbles existed and weren’t blind, then Wilma 
wouldn’t have conceived her. Whereas the first counterfactual is true, the second is obviously 
false: the possibility that Pebbles existed and Wilma didn’t conceive her is remote, to say the 
least.
13  See, for example, Elga (2001) and Vihvelin (1994).
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problem either doesn’t really solve the problem, as advertised, or has 
implications that are even less plausible than the Implausible Conclusion. 
It is tempting to think, then, that Boonin’s endorsement of the Implausible 
Conclusion is the least plausible feature of his view, and that his view as a 
whole is the most plausible of all the approaches to the non-identity 
problem. 
However, as he proceeds towards accepting the Implausible Conclusion, 
Boonin bites some other bullets along the way. If we count the Implausible 
Conclusion as one implausible tenet of his view, then his view as a whole 
includes at least three implausible tenets. In all three cases, Boonin provides 
independent arguments for thinking that the three tenets are not as 
implausible as they initially seem. However, it’s not clear that these other 
arguments are fully successful. In this final section, I want to explain the 
two implausible commitments Boonin’s view has in addition to the 
Implausible Conclusion; challenge some of his reasons for holding that 
these commitments are plausible, after all; and show why the existence 
solution avoids both of them.
The first bullet Boonin bites has to do with pre-emption cases like the 
following: 
Preemption. Shooter shoots Victim in the abdomen, and although 
Victim does not die, he must spend the next two weeks in the 
hospital. If Shooter hadn’t shot Victim, then Booter would have, and 
Victim would have ended up in the hospital with exactly the same 
injuries.14 
Recall that according to P2, if A’s act harms B, then A’s act makes B worse 
off than B would otherwise have been. Because Boonin accepts P2, he is 
committed to the implausible claim that in Preemption, Shooter does not 
harm Victim. 
Boonin accepts this implication of his view and argues that it is more 
plausible than it might initially appear to be. To show that such a claim is 
plausible, he constructs a number of thought experiments that he takes to 
be structurally similar to Preemption. He argues that in each case, the 
relevant action does not harm the victim, and that if it does not harm the 
victim, then Shooter’s action in Preemption doesn’t harm Victim, either. 
Here is a representative case: 
Trolley. Philip is trapped on a runaway trolley. The trolley is about to 
smash into a brick wall, which will kill him instantly. You can prevent 
this from happening by pulling a switch before the trolley approaches 
14  This case is modeled on the case Boonin calls “The Two Hit Men” (2014: 57). 
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a branch in the line. If you pull the switch, the trolley will be diverted 
and will instead smash into a second brick wall, which will also kill 
Philip instantly and at the exact same moment that the first wall would 
have killed him. You pull the switch. As a result, Philip is killed by 
smashing into the second brick wall rather than the first (58).
The problem with Boonin’s appeal to Trolley and similar cases is that our 
intuitions about these cases may not be finely tuned enough to support the 
judgment that 
(A) The action did not harm the victim
rather than
(B) The reason against the action was vanishingly weak.
In other words, both A and B might be reasonable ways to articulate our 
intuitions about Boonin’s cases. However, only A can support Boonin’s 
claim that it is plausible to think that Shooter’s action does not harm Victim 
in Preemption; B cannot. And it is not clear why we should think that A 
captures our intuition better than B.
Moreover, there are reasons to think that the judgment we should really 
form about Boonin’s cases is B, rather than A. If we conclude that in 
Preemption, Shooter does not harm Victim, various features of the case are 
difficult to explain. Why does Victim end up in the hospital for two weeks, 
if he wasn’t harmed?  Why is there blood leaking out of his abdomen? 
Importantly, the claim that Shooter harms Victim is compatible with the 
claim that the reason against shooting Victim was vanishingly weak: there 
is always a reason against harming, but the strength of that reason clearly 
varies from one case to another.15 The reason for me to refrain from 
pinching you on the arm in order to prevent a bomb from exploding is 
obviously weaker than the reason for me to refrain from pinching you on 
the arm in order to annoy you. Preemption and Trolley may well be cases 
where an action causes harm, but because of the unusual circumstances, 
it is simply less important to avoid causing that harm. Thus, taking these 
additional considerations into account, it remains implausible to hold that 
in Preemption, Shooter does not harm Victim.
Fortunately, a proponent of the existence solution to the non-identity 
problem does not have to bite the bullet that Boonin bites in the case of 
Preemption. According to the existence account of harming, Shooter 
harms Victim: Victim has suffered a harm, and by shooting Victim, Shooter 
caused that harm. This is a major advantage of the view, and it counts 
towards thinking that the existence solution is more plausible, on the 
15 See Gardner (2017).
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whole, than Boonin’s solution to the non-identity problem.
The other implausible implication of Boonin’s view is illustrated by the 
following case: 
Angry Alastair: Angry Alastair slaps you in the face. This is because he 
was trying to restrain himself; if he hadn’t slapped you in the face, he 
would have torn your arms off. 16 
Recall, once more, that Boonin accepts P2, which tells us that A’s act harms 
B only if A’s act makes B worse off than B would otherwise have been. This 
principle implies that Alastair does not harm you by slapping you in the 
face, since if he hadn’t slapped you in the face, you would have been even 
worse off. Boonin accepts this implication of his view and argues that it is 
more plausible that it might initially seem. His argument appeals to the 
following case: 
Parking Meter. Your car is parked in a space with an expired parking 
meter. A police officer is about to write you a $25 ticket, but then he 
notices that your door is unlocked and that there are four quarters in 
your cup holder. The police officer opens your door, takes the change, 
and feeds the meter. If he hadn’t taken the dollar’s worth of change 
from your cup holder, he would have written you the $25 ticket. 17
Boonin’s intuition about the case is that the police officer doesn’t harm 
you. But since Parking Meter is structurally similar to Angry Alastair, 
Alastair must not harm you in Angry Alastair, either.
Boonin’s argument is not convincing. In the case of Parking Meter, even 
if we have the intuition that you aren’t harmed, it’s not clear that the best 
explanation for this intuition is that P2 is true. An alternative explanation 
is that losing a dollar simply isn’t a big deal (at least for affluent people who 
own cars).18 Because it is easy to confuse a small harm with no harm, we 
need to test whether our intuitions are responding to the size of the loss or 
the absence of a necessary condition on harming. I propose that we 
16 A slightly longer description of the case appears in Boonin (2014: 62).
17 This is my paraphrase of the parking meter case in Boonin (2014: 62).
18 An anonymous reviewer suggests a third explanation: that money is not the 
currency of harm. While I agree with the reviewer that the concept of “financial harm” is less 
compelling than the concept of harm to one’s body or property, I disagree that Boonin’s case 
relies on the assumption that money really is the currency of harm. Boonin elsewhere makes 
it clear that he thinks well-being is the currency of harm. Thus, in Parking Meter, I take him 
to be suggesting that when the police officer takes your dollar, your well-being drops by an 
amount that corresponds to the loss of one dollar.  (And when I say “drops,” I am making a 
temporal comparison, rather than a counterfactual comparison:  your well-being is lower 
than it was before, but your well-being is not as low as it would have been had the police 
officer given you the ticket.) For more discussion about what we should take to be the 
currency of harm, see Tadros (2014).      
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consider a slightly different case:
Theft. Your car is parked in a space with an expired parking meter. 
Unfortunately, you have left a duffel bag containing $5,000 in the 
backseat. A police officer is angry that about the expired meter, and he 
wants to ram his police car into your parked car, causing you $8,000 in 
damage. However, he changes his mind and simply takes the duffel 
bag. 
Here, you are out $5,000, and I think it’s clearer that you are harmed. 
Moreover, Angry Alastair more closely resembles Theft than it resembles 
Parking Meter, given the size of the harms at issue. Thus, it remains 
implausible to claim that in Angry Alastair, you are not harmed. 
Here is how the existence account of harming supports the judgment 
that Alastair harms you: there is some general state of affairs either 
identical to or closely associated with the state of affairs in which you have 
been physically injured at all. If that state of affairs had not obtained, you 
would have been better off along some injury-related dimension of your 
well-being. Moreover, Alastair caused that general state of affairs, and so 
he harmed you. Importantly, the account does not necessarily imply that 
some specific upshot of the slap (such as a stinging cheek) is a harm to you. 
It may well be that if you hadn’t suffered the harm associated with the 
stinging cheek, you would have been worse off along the same dimension 
on which the cheek pain registers.19 But in this case, it’s reasonable to think 
that the slap is a benefit to you anyway, given that it prevents a greater 
harm. 
In other words, in Angry Alastair, the harm you suffer is that your well-
being is set back at all along a certain dimension, and not that your well-
being is set back some specific number of units along that dimension. This 
implication of the existence solution is more plausible, I think, than the 
claim that you are not harmed in any sense. 
6. CONCLUSION
Although Boonin critiques a number of different versions of the harm-
based approach to the non-identity problem, he does not critique the 
existence solution. I have argued that the existence solution holds up well 
19 On the other hand, if a stinging cheek corresponds to a completely different 
dimension of well-being than torn-off-arm pain, then there is a respect in which you would 
have been better off without the stinging cheek.  In that case, Alastair’s action causes you 
multiple harms:  the general harm of being injured at all and the specific harm of the stinging 
cheek.
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against the objections Boonin raises to the other harm-based views. I have 
also argued that the existence solution is more plausible that Boonin’s own 
proposal for solving the non-identity problem. Nevertheless, the existence 
solution is committed to some controversial claims about counterfactuals 
and causation. To fully vindicate the existence solution, we will need a 
more complete account of the semantics of both foretracking and 
backtracking counterfactuals, and we will need to situate them within a 
plausible theory of causation that distinguishes between causes and mere 
conditions. 
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